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 The welfare cost of Somali Piracy
Somalia has topped Foreign Policy’s list of failed states for the
past five consecutive years. And this has fuelled an industry
which reputedly generates around $120 million per year in net
profits. But at what cost to the world?
Unlike organised extraction by the state in the form of taxation,
piracy is disorganised predation. In the language of Olson
(1993), pirates are roving bandits while the state is a stationary
bandit and hence is in a better place to organise extraction of
resources at lower costs. So the study of piracy is an ideal
context to look at this issue empirically and to compare piracy
with extracting resources through taxation.
By matching data on piracy attacks in the Somalia area to data
on around 24,000 shipping contracts, we can estimate the
impact of piracy on shipping costs. Our results suggest that
shopping costs rise by around 10% when pirate activity
increased in Somalia. The estimates also suggest that it is
around 14% cheaper to charter ships through the Gulf of Aden
during the summer monsoon (July-August) than in spring
(March-April), when there is more piracy. And this seasonal
pattern in shipping prices is absent prior to the upsurge in pirate
activity in the region during 2008.
In the case of Somali piracy, ransoms transfer income to a poor
country (Somalia) which go to a particular group i.e. organised
criminals. It is far from clear how these benefits may trickle
down to the wider population; Shortland (2011) provides some
evidence that piracy revenue trickles into Somali society and has
a positive developmental effect. We feel it is best to remain
agnostic about this and base our welfare approach on Coate
(2000). Using his reasoning, we should care principally that any
transfer made to pirates is accomplished in the most efficient
way and hence the welfare loss are the resources spent in the
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way and hence the welfare loss are the resources spent in the
process of delivering the transfer.
Following this line of argument, we consider a thought
experiment where we replace piracy with a tax on shipping, the
proceeds of which are transferred to the pirates, yielding the
exact level of net revenues as they now receive from engaging in
piracy. We calculate that a tax rate of just 0.8% on chartering
would be needed to generate a transfer of comparable
magnitude to that generated by piracy. This contrasts with our
estimates of an increase in shopping costs of between 8% and
12%. This makes the predatory activity of the kind undertaken
by pirates between 10 and 16 times more costly than giving a
similar level tax-financed transfer to pirates.
The key source of inefficiency of piracy attacks is that the
increase in shipping charter rates due to piracy is not fully
captured by the pirates. Piracy leads to additional costs on
shippers, such as (i) the costs from the guard labour carried on
board ships to combat piracy, (ii) direct damage to ships due to
attacks, (iii) negotiation costs to release hijacked ships, and (iv)
the cost of additional insurances demanded by ship owners.
Moreover, there are good reasons to believe that estimates
based on the increase in shipping charter rates are a lower
bound on the true welfare cost: (i) our core calculation does not
factor in the demand response to these cost increases which
would reduce trade, (ii) we focus on the costs by the charterer
of a ship but some of the incidence could fall on ship owners,
(iii) there are piracy related expenses which increase the cost of
ship capacity and (iv) there are the costs of associated military
operations by various nations. Taking any of these into account
would only make piracy look even more inefficient as a
resource transfer mechanism.
Another way of looking at the welfare cost of piracy is to realise
that an industry worth $120 million a year in net profit to
Somali pirates is creating increased spending on shipping costs
of somewhere between $0.9 (the most conservative estimate) to
$3.3 billion (the high-end estimate). To put this in context, we
look at how many Somalis could be hired for one year using the
additional resources that it estimate are expended by the
shipping industry in response to the threat of piracy. Using
wage data from the Somali Food Security and Nutrition
Analysis Unit (FSNAU) presented we estimate a yearly wage of
around $900. This means that the additional spending due to
piracy could finance one year of employment for well over 1
million workers at the going market rate.
It is important to acknowledge that there is a wide range of
plausible estimates of these costs and shipping costs is only one
specific quantifiable aspect. Moreover examining this from the
perspective of shipping costs does yield numbers for welfare
costs which are quite a bit lower than are found in many
consultancy reports. A key point of contention is how to
measure the additional costs from military intervention; ships
have to be crewed and paid for whether or not they are
pursuing pirates, making this rather murky. We do add some
such costs, albeit conservatively, into our high-end estimates.
But quibbling over the exact numbers should not lose the focus
on the bigger picture. Quantifying these costs and comparing
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on the bigger picture. Quantifying these costs and comparing
them to the gains from the beneficiaries underlines the potential
benefits of establishing a functional state in Somalia which can
enforce law and order.
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